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Cultural Endowments, Institutional Renovation and Technical Innovation:
The Groupements Naam of Yatenga, Burkina Faso
Melinda Smale and Vernon W. Ruttan
In 1986, members of several villages placed the finishing touches on the Somiaga dam in
Yatenga region, Burkina Faso.  Over 500 meters in length and 4 meters deep, all except parts of
the concrete spillway and wings were built by the largely uncompensated labor of men and women
over a 5-6 year period (Harrison; Ouedraogo).  During the 1970s, farmers in Yatenga put some
60,000 hectares behind earthen dikes they built to harvest water and retain soil (Sanders et al.,
1990).  Finding that the earthen dikes were vulnerable to heavy rainfall, they switched to porous,
stone dikes.  By 1989, despite a labor input of up to 200 person-hours per hectare (Sanders et al.,
1990), an estimated 8,000 hectares in more than 400 Yatenga villages were again laced with the
more durable stone dikes (Critchley, 1991).
The work of an oriental despot
1 or some Hobbesian Leviathan?  In Yatenga, the most
environmentally degraded region of the Central Plateau of Burkina Faso, these water-retention
techniques may make profitable a technical package of improved sorghum seed and modest levels
of fertilizer (ICRISAT; Sanders et al., 1990).  A traditional method improved by Yatenga farmers
and members of the non-governmental organization OXFAM, the stone dikes have been in large
part diffused by the Groupements Naam (Harrison).  The Groupements Naam (Naam Groups) are￿Fetini (1993) defines three archetype models of institutional development:  innovation, adaptation, and
renovation. Renovation consists of building a new institution from an already existing but no longer functional
institution.  Fetini characterizes some aspects of the farmer group movement in the Sahelian region of Africa,
and in particular that of the Naam Groups, as institutional renovation.
￿For the rise and decline of community and integrated rural development programs see Ruttan (1975 and
1984).
￿Cultural endowments affect the innovation possibilities for institutional arrangements, much in the way




2 mutual assistance groups that are derived from the traditional age-set associations of
Mossi culture.  
The significance of the Groupements Naam experience is that it represents a particularly
successful example of a new set of "third generation" rural development efforts.  In contrast to the
earlier "community development" and "integrated rural development" efforts this most recent
expression emphasizes the role of indigenous local membership groups and support
organizations.
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Culture in the Study of Economic Development
In the theory of economic development, the term "culture" has been  unpopular since the
view that peasant traditions generated barriers to development was supplanted by the doctrine,
later promoted by the Green Revolution, that small farmers are poor but rational agents (Ruttan,
1988).  In growth theory, the process of institutional change and the role of culture in that process
has been neglected relative to the process of technical change.  Yet culture shapes the institutions
that facilitate or impede technical change.
4  It has become ￿A recent initiative undertaken by the Africa Technical Department of the World Bank seeks to better
integrate traditional cultural traits and incentives in the design and management of projects. M. Dia argues that
conventional development projects have erred by emphasizing technical criteria without recognizing the need
to adapt assistance to local culture (1992).
￿The approach used by de Janvry et al. to analyze farm household behavior when markets fail may provide
a means for investigating the role as market surrogates of kinship and mutual assistance institutions in
traditional societies.
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apparent to donors that failure to understand and nurture the process of institutional change has
been a major source of failure of many development assistance projects.
5
In the economic theory of rational choice, culture is not an explanatory variable but an
unobservable parameter on which the utility function is conditioned.  In general, conventional
microeconomic models based on assumptions of atomistic rational farmers are too limiting to
incorporate analytically the role of public or community interests in individual decision-making
(Uzawa).  For example, one of the major microeconomic theoretical constructs used to analyze
farmer decision-making in agrarian societies of Sub-Saharan Africa and elsewhere is the farm
household model.  The diagnostic and predictive power of the farm household model rests on the
assumption that the needs of individual household members are satisfied through one
self-contained producing and consuming unit.  Yet, in much of Sub-Saharan Africa, and in the
Mossi culture described in this paper, different, overlapping groups come together to meet either
production or consumption needs of household members (Ellsworth).
6  According to Fafchamps
(1992), one reason that positivist economists feel uncomfortable with issues like culture is that
they prefer deterministic theory.  Variables such as culture lead to multiple rather than single
equilibria.   4
The example of the Naam Groups, presented here, illustrates why economists who study
innovations need to attempt to move cultural endowments from an invisible position behind the
utility function to a more analytical position in a jointly determined system with resource
endowments, technology and institutions (Ruttan, 1988).  The story of the Naam Groups
generates three hypotheses that are related to this issue.  First, cultural endowments may shape
the propensity of communities to build or reform institutions that can serve as vehicles for their
own socioeconomic development.  Any particular cultural endowment may either enhance or
impede the possibilities for institutional change.  Cultural endowments such as the tradition of
strongly disciplined, self-reliant Kombi-Naam may increase the supply of institutions by reducing
the cost of social consensus (Ruttan and Hayami; North).  Some traditional organizations can be
"renovated" (Fetini) as progressive institutions.
Second, such renovated institutions may facilitate certain technical innovations because (a)
they provide an incentive-compatible mechanism for the allocation of the benefits of collective
action and public investments without which the proposed technique would not be privately
profitable, or (b) they alter the private economic benefits of a technical innovation by lengthening
the planning horizon or adding psychic premiums.  Third, this last possibility, as well as the fact
that such institutions are renovated rather than transferred, may increase the opportunities for
technical changes and productivity increases that endure.  The paper closes with some caveats on
the potential for replicability and continuity in institutions like those of the Naam movement.￿The description of the Kombi-Naam is drawn from Ouedraogo's account, which he based on interviews
with elders who had been courtiers for the last king of Yatenga.  A similar description is found in Skinner
(n.d.).
￿There are many definitions of culture in the anthropological literature.  In the context of this paper, one
of the more helpful and contemporary perspectives is that the basis of culture is the means of preserving order
(Gans).  In economist North's framework, culture is the socially transmitted body of teachings, knowledge and
values which generate the informal constraints that, combined with formal rules, compose institutions.
Institutions are the constraints on individual choice sets that humans devise to shape their interaction (1990).
In political scientist Ostrom's view, "culture" is in large part made up
of the norms and codes of behavior that have evolved to counteract opportunistic behavior (1992).  In some
recent literature the term "social capital" is being used to refer to what has in earlier literature been identified
as cultural endowments.
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Cultural Endowments and the Naam Movement
What is the Kombi-Naam?
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Here, the term "cultural endowments" refers broadly to the dimensions of culture,
including religion and ideology, that have been transmitted from the past.
8  Those endowments
most clearly instrumental in the formation of today's Naam Groups are expressed in the operation
of the Kombi-Naam, one of the traditional mutual assistance organizations of the Mossi who
inhabit the Yatenga province of Burkina Faso.   
A stylized picture of traditional Yatenga society provides a point of departure for
understanding the traditional and potential role of the Kombi-Naam.  Based on segmentary
lineage groups, the pre-colonial Mossi were organized hierarchically into about 20 centralized
kingdoms, including the kingdom of Yatenga, which is estimated to date from 1540 (Izard,
1985a,b).  Mossi kings were not so much placed at an apex of a pyramidal structure, but at the
symbolic center of a loosely woven political web (Hammond).  Skinner (1964) calls the Mossi
kingdoms "confederacies".  The characteristic feature of the Yatenga society was its ability to6
integrate each member into a well-defined role at the same time that it limited the potential for
social or technical change.  Through the symbolic authority of the king and court, girded by a
nexus of customs and subordination to kin group, individual initiatives were regulated in order to
preserve the stability of the community.  To Ouedraogo, in this stylized Yatenga society, social
equilibrium was achieved at the cost of technical stagnation (Ouedraogo).  To Hammond, the very
continuity of Mossi society in the face of colonialism can be explained by the absence of
technological innovation.   Moreover, in a Boserupian framework incentives for land saving
technological innovation would be limited as long as population density remained low and land
abundant, limiting the potential gains from the adoption of innovations.      
The Kombi-Naam was a temporary association of young men and women from the same
age group, re-established spontaneously in each generation when they gathered to choose leaders
and designate annual group activities.  They worked in common fields, provided labor in the fields
of those who demanded or were in need of special assistance, and were remunerated in kind
according to the nature of the labor and the means of the household employing them.  Certain
other vital community tasks were collectively and cheaply completed by the youth association.  At
the close of the year, to mark the dissolution of that particular realization of the Kombi-Naam,
they organized a festival to which youth of other villages were invited. 
Several features of the Kombi-Naam bear special interest to the study of institutional and
technical change.  The first special feature of the Kombi-Naam is that membership and internal
leadership cut through the hierarchy to include individuals from all socio-occupational sets,
including minorities and servile groups.  Strict sexual mores were enforced, to encourage young
men and women to learn mutual respect in a cooperative work environment.  For a moment in7
time, all villagers of that generation were "equal".  
The second special feature was the method for selecting leaders.  In contrast to Western
definitions of democracy as majority rule, Ouedraogo describes the traditional election as an
exercise in "qualitative democracy." Consensus was achieved when unanimity emerged from a
long process of palaver and mutual concessions.
       A third special feature is that the Kombi-Naam leadership included some dignitaries who
represented institutions of the greater traditional society.   The link between youth and elders
mediated inter-generational tensions in a society where age conferred status.  The content of the
cooperative work activities, such as cleaning of the village mosque, increased positive
intergenerational contact.
      The signal feature of the Kombi-Naam, for our purposes, is the tradition of rigorous discipline
and the denial of opportunism to which youth freely consented, given that unanimity had been
achieved for certain key decisions.  Hammond observed that "the young people set to work
without supervision after the leader and farmer have agreed upon a price...work is performed
collectively and profits shared equally"(p. 91).
Other related facts about the historical evolution of the Kombi-Naam are also important to
remember.  The first is that the concept of Naam is a dominant leitmotiv in the lives of the Mossi
of Burkina Faso (Skinner, 1964; Izard).  Literally, Naam means chieftainship (Ouedraogo),
sovereignty or power (Izard, 1985b), or the power first possessed by the ancient founders
(Skinner, 1964).  Philosophically, the Mossi refer to it as that "force of God that enables one
person to dominate others" (Skinner, 1964, p.13).  Many of the key economic, political, religious
and social institutions of the Mossi are patterned around Naam and are designated by titles8
derived from that word (Izard, 1985b; Skinner, 1964).  
Second, the colonial regime attempted unsuccessfully to incorporate Mossi society by
making use of Kombi-Naam labor groups to produce cotton.  The Kombi-Naam fled to the Gold
Coast to escape the work or were sent away as forced laborers to the Ivory Coast (Skinner, n.d.). 
This occurrence may have been the origin of the "coming of age" migration patterns that later
became customary in the life-cycles of young men.  To Ouedraogo, much of the motivation for
rebuilding the Kombi-Naam as a development tool was, ironically, to counteract the outmigration
of youth.
Finally, one detail reported by Hammond (1966) sheds light on how work groups such as
the Kombi-Naam interacted with the broader society, such as other ethnic groups, the colonial
regime, or currently, international development organizations.  The internal cohesion and
independence of the work group was protected by the fact that only the senior member of the
work groups came into direct contact with non-Mossi (presumably, other ethnic or colonial)
employers.  Work groups interacted with "outsiders" through trusted intermediaries.   In
terms of its potential role in the process of institutional and technical change, what was most
limiting about the Kombi-Naam? First, the experience in equality, self-reliance, community
service, and mutual assistance lasted only one year.  Second, at the close of the year, the stock of
earnings accumulated as compensation in the course of Kombi-Naam activities was exhausted in
one ceremony.  Youth carried the sense of having participated into adulthood, but the titles and
active solidarity were embodied only in the Kombi-Naam institution.  Servants then undertook
their hereditary occupation as servants, and young women prepared to become wives and mothers
in a patriarchal society. 9
What Explains the Existence of The Kombi-Naam? 
The Kombi-Naam is only one of a number of traditional associations that promoted
mutual assistance, cooperative work projects, and solidarity among the Mossi of Yatenga.  
Ouedraogo stresses repeatedly in his book that one of the essential values of the Mossi is that of
solidarity.  He cites a Mossi proverb: "one should not only wash one's own belly, but also the
back of another..."(p. 175).  Ellsworth (1988) presents evidence of the enduring economic
importance of such associations in Burkina Faso.  In general, mutual assistance groups and
solidarity networks are a common feature of traditional societies, but not necessarily of societies
in transition.  
Anthropologists, political scientists and economists have long debated why such groups
exist and how effective they are.  For political scientists, the focal question has been under what
conditions voluntary cooperation exists without the imposition of a coercive state.   Economists
have often expressed the issue in terms of the contradiction between altruism and the pursuit of
self-interest.  
Scott (1976) explained the existence of mutual assistance and solidarity networks in
southeast Asia through the "subsistence ethic" of peasants, which reflected, in a "moral economy",
the overriding and common need to organize against food crises.  Opposing Scott's view, Popkin
(1979) argued that collective action often fails because of the opportunistic behavior of peasants
who have no incentive to organize cooperative strategies.   Collective action can succeed, said
Popkin, when leadership is provided by agents whose religious or ideological motives are less
vulnerable to self-interest (Feeny).  Posner (1980) reconciled the views of Scott and Popkin by
arguing that mutual assistance systems can be sustained in the long run by the existence of a
lasting relationship between self-interested members.  Similarly, anthropologists have long￿In a related argument, Runge (1981) reformulated the common property problem as a cooperative game
in which individual choices are interdependent and gains are possible through "assuring" (Sen) coordinated
expectations about others' actions.  This formulation shifts the emphasis from the individual profit motive for
exploiting common property to the institutional and legal context of the decision. 
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recognized that gift-giving is a form of commodity exchange that, as compared to an impersonal
exchange of goods in a market, establishes a durable personal relationship between donor and
recipient (Mauss; Gregory).   Posner's argument was formalized in work by Kimball (1988) and
others.  Related literature, models and arguments are exhaustively reviewed by Platteau (1991)
and Fafchamps (1992).
Political scientists and economists have relied largely on the game theoretic approach to
present the formal explanation for the existence of  mutual assistance groups and cooperation. 
They solved Olson's "free-rider" problem (1965) by showing that in repeated, rather than one-shot
games, there  is no dominant strategy.  Wealth- or utility-maximizing individuals will find it
worthwhile to cooperate with other players when the game is repeated, when they possess
complete information about the other players' past performance, and/or when there are a small
number of players.
9  Building on the extensive literature and expanding the game theoretic
approach, Fafchamps (1992) has demonstrated how key observed features of mutual assistance
groups and solidarity networks can be explained through the theory of repeated games.  Using a
different approach with game theory, Ostrom (1990) demonstrates simply that a contract enforced
by unanimous approval of the rules, such as in Ouedraogo's "qualitative democracy", can result in
a cooperative equilibrium in which agents share costs and returns from common property. 
The use of game theory in this context has also been criticized.  When game theory is used
as the construct for explaining why mutual assistance groups exist, the analysis focuses on how
cooperation results from the optimal meeting of game-derived demand functions, rather than the11
institutionalized incentives individuals have to participate (Ellsworth) or how the costs of
transacting are altered by different institutional structures (North).   As Fafchamps (1992) argues,
repeated game theory does not explain how specific organizational structures or mutual assistance
associations are chosen.  The elements needed to build such a theory, says Fafchamps, would
include culture, political institutions, and historical events.   For the purposes of this paper,
although game theory can be used to explain the existence of the Kombi-Naam, it tells us little
about whether the Kombi-Naam can evolve as an institution that supports technical innovation. 
Game theory can be used to demonstrate why a particular institution assures a stable equilibrium,
but cannot explain why that institution (and not another) evolved historically.
Mutual assistance groups and solidarity networks can also be viewed as special cases of
risk-pooling insurance mechanisms in which villagers organize vertically (as in patron-client
relationships) or horizontally (as in the original Kombi-Naam) to protect themselves against
famine and other disasters.   In the land-abundant, semi-arid countries with simple technology,
high covariance of risk in crop or livestock output helps to explain the lack of formal insurance
mechanisms and the need for geographically extensive social institutions or private capital
accumulation in the form of grain stocks or livestock (Binswanger and McIntyre, 1987).   As
population densities increase, however, the propensity to rely on such extensive social institutions
as insurance mechanisms can be expected to decrease because of the reduced cost of the
infrastructure and access to economic activities with less co-variation.  Although the Kombi-
Naam were organized horizontally, the only risk they were designed to cover, or could cover
effectively, was uncorrelated and specific, such as providing labor to assist the sick or needy.￿￿Much of this section is drawn from Ouedraogo's book.  See footnote 4 for an appropriate definition of
institutions from North (1990).
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The Kombi-Naam and Technical Change
Two prominent features of the Kombi-Naam institution, cited above, blocked its
usefulness as a collective instrument for technical innovation.  First, membership in each
realization of the Kombi-Naam was only temporary.  There was no time for individuals to reap
long-term benefits from today's investment in mutual assistance.  Second, the Kombi-Naam
accumulated no capital but spent it all in one annual festival.  Presenting similar evidence for other
societies, Platteau concludes that many traditional village support systems provided disincentives
for investment.  In the context of the induced innovation model (Hayami and Ruttan), some of the
changes in factor endowments necessary to influence the real factor prices and the demand for
technical innovations generally would be mitigated by traditional institutions like the
Kombi-Naam. 
Nor does much capital accumulation appear to have occurred in the Mossi kingdoms in
general.  In general wealth in pre-colonial West Africa was based on control over people (and
hence, given land tenure arrangements, over space).   Although the Mossi believed that their king
was wealthy, visiting Europeans and scholars appear to have found slight difference between the
standard of living of the rulers and that of the people and questioned the economic base of the
Mossi kingdoms' political organization (Hammond; Skinner, 1964).
Renovating the Kombi-Naam Institution
10
Bernard L. Ouedraogo, the charismatic leader of today's Naam movement, is a Burkinabe13
sociologist with long experience developing public education programs.   Disenchanted with the
standard public education model, dissatisfied with farmers' attitudes toward extension services,
and concerned, as were many other public leaders, about the speed of youth outmigration from
rural areas, he undertook to initiate a process of building a community development institution
from the traditional Kombi-Naam.  In his own words, he and his co-workers sought "development
without damage (développer sans abîmer)"(Ouedraogo, p.13).
The process of renovation occurred in several stages.  First, public education programs
that had been originally designed to provide basic instruction to village children were re-organized
as training programs for young farmers (Formation des Jeunes Agriculteurs, or FJA).  The FJA
were then broadened to include post-school farmer youth groups (Groupements des Jeunes
Agriculteurs, or GJA).   In 1967, The GJA were then "grafted" onto the Kombi-Naam by
redefining rules of function and organization.   
  As in the Kombi-Naam, the GJA/Naam Groups maintained close ties with village elders. 
To gain acceptance in a village, the GJA/Naam Groups provided assistance to village elders,
retaining an honorary presidential post for elders (usually an ex-soldier who had travelled), and in
return, obtaining land use rights from elders, borrowing their plows and oxen.  As in the
Kombi-Naam, membership of the GJA/Naam was open to individuals of all ethnic and
socio-occupational groups.  Leaders were selected through a consensus process similar to that
used in the Kombi-Naam, although the leadership functions were defined in new ways.  The
general functions of the GJA/Naam Groups were newly defined as (1) educational (2) political (3)
recreational and (4) economic. 
Ouedraogo recognized that (1) temporary association and (2) inability to accumulate
capital were inherent features of the Kombi-Naam institution that needed to change before the14
traditional institution could be used as a development tool by the community.  Solving the capital
accumulation problem in function (4) of the GFA/Naam Groups entailed convincing members that
the earnings once exhausted at the annual festival could be more usefully directed toward
collective savings and investment decisions.
The second institutional modification--prolonging the lifespan of the Naam Groups--seems
to have been reinforced by concurrent changes in resource endowments.  Those who joined the
GJA/Naam in the 1960s remained members well into adulthood in the 1970s.  Ouedraogo and
others (Gentil; Pradervand) contend that the 1967-1985 period of low rainfall, which included the
severe droughts of 1967-73 and 1982-84, contributed to the proliferation of the Naam Groups. 
In order to reclaim degraded land through the construction of dikes, dams, reservoirs, and other
public works, villagers needed cooperative collective action.  In terms of the induced innovation
framework, a change in resource endowments (the drought) increased the demand for an
institution of collective action, and cultural endowments (the Kombi-Naam) increased the supply
by reducing the cost of institutional change.   In terms of the Binswanger and McIntyre paradigm,
the drought period is likely to have increased the desirability of geographically extensive insurance
mechanisms even though rising population densities over time on the Mossi plateau would be
expected to decrease the demand for such institutions. 
The Naam Groups of today are a diaspora of associations that include young and old, men
and women.  Crudely, the "renovation" of the Kombi-Naam extended the payback period for
investment in mutual assistance and diversified its portfolio.  Conceived with the objective of
encouraging youth to remain in the villages rather than join the rural exodus, the future dynamism
of the Naam movement depends on the extent to which it can prolong or reproduce cooperative
relationships. 15
Technical Innovation
In the Sahelian and Sudanian climatic zones of the semi-arid regions of Sub-Saharan
Africa, the principal production constraints are soil moisture and low soil fertility.  In many years,
land degradation has caused even further deterioration in soil quality.  Recognition of high capital
and maintenance costs has deterred investments in conventional, large-scale irrigation projects
over the past two decades (Matlon; Harrison).  Numerous other water conservation or retention
techniques are potentially important, particularly in degraded Sudanian regions like Yatenga.  In
areas such as Yatenga, rainfall is low and irregular and soil encrustation leads to infiltration
problems.  Water-retention techniques can reduce runoff and help exploit rainfall by increasing the
effectiveness of nutrients, especially when combined with improvements in soil fertility (Sanders
et al.). 
Sorghum and millet are the staple cereals in the Sahelo-Sudanian zones of Burkina Faso. 
Based on the record of nearly a decade of research on new technologies in Burkina Faso, Sanders
et al.  conclude that only with increased soil moisture and moderate fertilizer application (organic
or inorganic) are improved sorghum varieties significantly higher yielding and more profitable
with a low degree of risk.  Increasing soil moisture when the nutrient levels remain low does not
generate large yield increases; applying fertilizers (organic or inorganic) without an assured water
supply is economically risky since the response to fertilizer is dependent on the availability of
water at critical stages of plant development (Sanders and Ramaswamy).  They argue that
moderate improvements in agronomic environment would provide breeders with an opportunity
for success by limiting the extreme variability in plant environment.  As they portray it, technical
change in the Sahel is a staged process, depending on initial soil conditions and isohyet (Sanders￿￿This bears some resemblance to the Boserup (1965) hypothesis that with increased population density
(alternatively, persons/land unit), investments in land and soil fertility maintenance result from the need to raise
land productivity and offset the increased labor required to meet subsistence requirements.
￿￿Depending on the location, conservation activity and time, reports differ about whether public financing
or Food-for-Work was used to compensate labor. Much of the work, particularly in the early years of the Naam
movement and when innovations such as the dikes were constructed in the fields of individual farmers, appears
not to have been externally financed.  
16
et al.; Sanders and Ramaswamy).  The adoption of water-retention/soil-fertility technologies is the
pre-condition for the productivity increases associated with varietal change. 
Using the induced innovation framework, Sanders et al. argue that with the Sahelian
drought, changes in resource endowments spurred the demand for technical innovation.  As soil
resources declined from depletion and erosion, and non-farm employment opportunities (even
through migration to the south) grew less rapidly than rural population, farmers were induced to
adopt yield-increasing, labor-intensive technologies such as contour dikes and
organic fertilizer.
11  Dike construction increases labor utilization especially during the out-of-crop
season periods when the opportunity costs of labor have traditionally been low.  Sanders et al.
(1990) report that the region of most rapid adoption of water-retention/soil-fertility technologies
has been Yatenga, even though the estimated rates of return to the technologies are higher in
other, less degraded regions.  They explain this anomaly by hypothesizing that unless farmers are
pressured by soil deterioration and falling labor/land price ratios, the implicit returns on these
large labor inputs are too low to interest farmers (p.8).  As suggested here, however, there may
also be cultural reasons why diffusion was more rapid in Yatenga.
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One of the more effective dike (alternatively, diguette, bund, contour ridge, or contour
line) techniques had its genesis in Mossi methods.  Based on field work in western Burkina Faso,
Savonnet (1958) identified and described in detail four different techniques for soil erosion and17
water control among Mossi and other ethnic groups.  These and other techniques used historically
by the Mossi are also reported in Reij (1989), Critchley (1990, 1992), and Djibo (1991).  Many of
these techniques had fallen into disuse.  The efficiency of stone and earthern lines was limited
principally because contours were not accurately measured, and other construction details such as
stone placement and line spacing needed improvement. 
Harrison (1987) calls the process of dike improvement in Yatenga "barefoot science." 
When OXFAM began work on an agroforestry project in Yatenga in 1979, one of their field
workers brought the concept of water-harvesting from a visit to the Negev desert in Israel.   In
emphasizing that their priority was food production rather than agro-forestry, farmers helped shift
the design of the project.  The farmers and the OXFAM project director set to work improving
the simple stone contour line.  One improvement involved the placing of large foundation stones
preceded by smaller stones to act as a permeable water filter (Critchley, 1990).  But accurate
contours are impossible to gauge by eye on the slight slopes (2-3 percent, according to Reij et al.)
in Yatenga.  Aside from questions of spacing, breadth and depth, the key was the development of
a simple hosepipe water level that costs 6 dollars to make, can be mastered by illiterate villagers in
a day or two, and ensures correct alignment of the contours (Wright; Harrison).  The Naam
Groups subsequently adopted the technique and diffused it as rapidly as OXFAM itself (Younger
and Bonkoungou; Harrison).  Reij et al. classify contour lines as macrocatchment water harvesting
or as "water harvesting from long slopes" (p. 48).  As compared to earthen dikes, permeable stone
dikes slow surface runoff and increase the water infiltration rate rather than retaining water.  Field
experimentation suggests that particularly in clayey soils, earthen dikes can reduce yields because
of waterlogging.  In either clay or sandy soils with slight slopes, permeable stone dikes distribute
water more evenly throughout the field (Eger).  Earthen dikes also break more easily in the heavy18
downpours and sheet water movement characteristic of the area.
Permeable stone dikes control both water and soil loss.  In the short-term, the contour
dikes improve crop yields in two ways.  The dikes improve infiltration by controlling rainfall
runoff, increasing water absorption by crops and land.  Second, fertilizer (usually manure) and
other organic material applied behind the dikes is much more effective since it is less likely to be
washed away.  The organic matter also attracts termites that bore into the ground and aerate the
soil.  Over the longer term, the principal advantage of the dikes is erosion control and an increase
in soil quality.
The evidence on the economic rate of return to contour dikes is positive, but patchy and
inconclusive.  According to Sanders and Ramaswamy (1992), the yield effects of contour dikes
combined with organic fertilizer placed behind the dikes are "small but the diffusion is
impressive"(p. 249).  Based on the short-term yield increases resulting from the introduction of
contour dikes in farmers' fields, Matlon and Spencer (1984) describe them as "among the most
promising technologies available for semi-arid zones with moderate to high population pressure"
(p. 673).  In 1985, ICRISAT evaluated a package of stone dikes, tied ridges, a low dose of
fertilizer, and an improved sorghum variety.  On farmers' fields, where only the package was
evaluated, the yield difference was 67 percent in only the first year in the Sahelian (less favored)
zone.  They calculated that a break-even sorghum yield increment of only 155 kg would assure a
return of 15 percent on labor and cash investment, which was exceeded by over two-thirds of
farmer participants in the Sahelo-Sudanian zone.  As a comparison of rules-of-thumb, CIMMYT
usually recommends using a discount rate of 50 percent for technologies that are familiar to the
farmer, and up to 100 percent for technologies that are unknown to the farmer.  In either case a
15 percent discount rate is generous in that it does not incorporate risk and uncertainty factors. 19
On the other hand, all data came from the first year of application only--understating the rate of
return for the package over time as the effects of the contour dikes on soil quality cumulate.  On
researcher-managed fields in the Sahelian zone, the yield increment from stone dikes alone was 40
percent in the first year.  OXFAM's data is less controlled, but generally shows statistically
significant yield increases with stone contours on farmers' fields, with the highest differential
occurring in dry years (Wright).
Using ICRISAT's cost data and some of the lower yield differentials in Wright's data,
Younger and Bonkoungou estimated an internal rate of return to the OXFAM project (excluding
the diffusion outside of the project zone by the Naam Groups) of about 40 percent.  For a new
hectare of land (excluding sunk R and D costs), the rate of return they calculate is 147 percent. 
They conclude that the most obvious proof of economic return is the speed of diffusion, without
artificial incentives or subsidies, among Yatenga farmers.  In an appendix, they report that in the
project zone only between 1981 and 1986, about 2000 ha were treated with stone contour dikes. 
For approximately the same time period, Critchley (1991) reports an estimated 8000 ha treated in
Yatenga province (including the project zone and other areas).  Estimating the area covered is
difficult because the dikes are constructed by both groups and individuals on communal fields,
village lands, isolated individual fields and multiple, adjacent fields. 
Institutions such as the Naam Groups, however, affect the calculation of rates of return to
investment in technologies such as the contour dikes, larger-scale dams and water retention
infrastructure.  As North argues, institutions affect the costs of exchange and production through
determining transaction and transformation costs (p. 5).  Existing rates of return calculation do
not capture the external effects of dike construction by one farmer on other farmers' fields, or the
possible cost-reducing effects of construction by a Naam group as compared to construction by20
an individual.  Dikes are a divisible, but lumpy technology.  The only portion of the decision that
is measured in conventional rate of return analyses is the private benefit to the farmer of planting a
fertilized, improved cultivar behind the dike.
Viability of the Naam Groups and Their Activities
Important caveats are nevertheless raised by the story of the Naam Groups, several of
which are recognized in the writings of Ouedraogo, his supporters and his critics.  The first set of
caveats is related to continuity of the Naam movement itself.  The second set is related to the
issue of replicability.
Continuity
(i)   economic viability
To secure the necessary seed capital for the Naam Groups, its creators insisted that in a
first phase capital should be self-generated, "so that potential supporters and detractors of the
organization could take it seriously" (Fetini).  The basic organization of savings and credit in the
Naam Groups is described by Ouedraogo.  All earnings are deposited in a bank  account,
distributed in three unequal parts depending on the needs of the Group.  The first part is seed
money for a revolving fund or for repaying loans taken from the bank.  The second, smallest part,
is an expense account for funding annual harvest festivals.  The third part is for expansion of
activities through purchase of factors of production, or for livestock and tool replacement.  To
draw individual loans from the account, such as consumption credit, is prohibited. 
In 1976, to meet the challenges of training farmers in both technical spheres and in project
development, and to relieve key scientific or capital constraints in projects they identified,
Ouedraogo and a colleague (Bernard Lecomte) established an umbrella organization that also21
includes local and international NG0s across the Sahelian region, the 6-S (Se Servir de la Saison
Sèche en Savane et au Sahel).  Although the 6-S expands the capital base of the Naam
movement, a large proportion of funds are provided as reimbursable loans.  
Central to the financial functioning of the 6-S is the notion of fonds souples (flexible
funds), as contrasted to project aid.  Initially, modest funds are made available without earmarking
them for specific end-uses.  The funds are distributed only when a Group shows sufficient
initiative, and are increased only as the Group demonstrates management ability.  When a project
becomes profitable, the funds are reimbursed and the money is recycled to  another project.  At
the level of the NGO, the funds are a grant, but they are used as a 70 percent reimbursable loan by
the Naam recipients.  That 70 percent is then placed in a revolving fund to be extended to poorer
Naam Groups.  Funding then diminishes or ceases when Groups demonstrate enough efficiency to
attract other donors (Fetini).
As the Naam Groups proliferate and as the range of the commercial activities expands,
some groups and some activities are clearly more successful than others.  Ouedraogo stresses the
significance of the villagers' acceptance of the revolving fund concept, of which they were
originally suspect.  He relates how the concept was explained to villagers, and how in the
ideology of the Naam movement, they are constantly reminded of how their actions relate not
only to their own Group, but to the potential of other, less well-endowed Groups. The concept of
repayment with interest and the prohibition on giving credit or food to the needy from the Group
account have been difficult but usually not insuperable problems.  In some cases, more flexible
arrangements have been developed. 
Naam groups engage in a portfolio of activities, only some of which generate cash income. 
The commercial activities of the Naam Groups include the purchase, installation, and operation of22
grain mills, the constitution and regulation of village grain banks, livestock production, artisanry,
vegetable production on irrigated plots operated by the collective, and petty trading.  Some
(Beaudoux and Nieuwkerk; Gentil) have expressed reservation about the economic performance
of some of these activities. 
But Ouedraogo and others emphasize that commercial activities are in some sense of
lesser importance to the long-term vitality of the group than the community and social activities
that lend the group its fundamental cohesion.  Ouedraogo describes water-retention work as one
of the principal activities of the Naam Groups, although he classifies it as a "community" rather
than an "economic" activity.  In his survey of several hundred groups, Buisrogge (1989) was
startled to find that among the groups that identified future intended activities, most were best
classified as public work projects.  He explains that for many of the villages beset by drought and
youth outmigration, community action was a question of survival.  To maintain viable
communities, it was necessary to retain the population.  Questions of environment and soil
fertility, for example, were foremost.
The very breadth in Naam Group activities may be a key to their success in adopting and
diffusing agricultural technology.  One problem with many failed efforts at community action in
agricultural experimentation and terrace building is that people were organized for too limited a
set of tasks and the transactions costs were not compensated by the specific activity.  The lesson
to be learned may be that, in encouraging one community-based activity, it is better to base the
work within existing institutions and to ensure that the institutions have a life beyond that
particular activity (R. Tripp, personal communication).
Pradervand refers to the 6-S as the first international organization run by peasants.
Harrison writes that in the 6-S, professionals and experts take up their proper role of training,23
technical and financial back-up, but "the heart of the Naam is...in the villages"(p. 282). 
Ouedraogo himself concludes that the future of the federation in the 6-S, in terms of retaining a
sense of village base and control while satisfying requirements for long-term financial viability, is
unsure.
Project aid and new technologies are usually evaluated in terms of simplistic measures of
economic rate of return.  Is there something more important at work in the Naam movement than
measurable current profits or easily measured rates of economic return?  The Naam movement is
now in its third decade--a life longer than most technical assistance projects.  Both Pradervand
and Buisrogge suggest that, in a sense, individuals who choose to  remain in the village and
participate in groups like those of the Naam may derive psychic "premiums" from a renewed
sense of community and self and a rediscovery of their own cultural past.  The potential of such
institutions to initiate and sustain technical innovations and productivity increases may be great. 
(ii) political viability
Political viability is a second issue that is related to continuity of the Naam movement. 
Assembling data from across West Africa, Gentil describes the current farmer movement as
consisting of three types of groups: (1) groups promoted by a non-statal apparatus, such as a
church or NGO, (2) groups initiated by farmers, but linked closely to a charismatic leader with
non-farmer status, and (3) groups initiated and sustained by farmers and farmer leaders.  He
claims that a large proportion of the groups are created and dissolved within a short period of
time.  He describes many of the groups as artificial and entirely dependant on external
organizations.
Some groups have clearly been initiated by, and derive their strength from, village24
communities.  But the unique qualities of groups like those of the early Naam movement may
succumb to externally-driven development fads and fashions or evolve from democratic to
oligarchic control (Fisher, 1994).  Certainly the Naam Federation of today is likely to include
more "collective opportunists" than in the early years before government acceptance and the
establishment of the 6-S.  The Naam movement was officially recognized in 1978 by the
government of Burkina Faso, and the Naam Groups were then federated and linked to a broader
national structure.  Most of the groups in Buisrogge' survey (1989) were formed around
1974-1977, when the government began to pursue specific community development policies.  In
general, one of the most remarkable aspects of the Naam movement is how its leaders have been
able to work effectively with revolutionary regimes in Burkina Faso as well as in other parts of
West Africa (Skinner, n.d.).  A more philosophical question is, however, the extent to which the
views of Naam farmers, rooted in their own experience and localities, can continue to mesh with
those of the national politicians and the international development organizations.  As the scale of
the Naam bureaucracy and the involvement of its leaders with national politics and donor culture
increase, how will the institution evolve?
Further, through the Naam movement, a substantial portion of the labor-intensive work
involved in constructing infrastructure and of the costly work of on-farm research and
demonstrations is being transferred from the state to its poorest citizens.  One might hypothesize
that some "enlightened" governments may choose to use farmer groups to shift the burden of
development costs back onto rural communities.  Some governments may find it in their interest
to "co-opt" successful farmer groups in order to consolidate their own political base.  The case of
the Bakel farmer groups in Senegal, detailed by Adams (1981), demonstrates that at least some
associations perceive government recognition as potentially exploitative and resist assimilation. 25
Skinner (n.d.) is suspicious that the development community, unwilling and unable to obtain or
use effectively the tremendous amount of resources necessary to assist Africa, may have simply
decided to turn the problems over to Africans.  According to one example he cites, the Naam
Groups were viewed by some as "rivaling" other development organizations.  It is not surprising,
then, that their role may often have been downplayed by envious development practitioners. 
Finally, can movements such as the Naam Groups resist co-option by international NGOs?  Over
the past few decades, a proliferation of NGOs have gradually assumed the tasks of community
development (and more) from bilateral development assistance institutions.  Yet some have
expressed concern that many of them may be repeating the same errors (Ward). 
Replicability
A second set of issues relates to the potential for replicating the Naam experience in other
regions of Sub-Saharan Africa.  The Naam movement and similar farmer organizations are
widespread in the Sahel, and particularly in Senegal and Burkina Faso.  Gentil cites a number of
factors that are likely to be related to the evolution of successful farmer movements.  The first is
the openness of the surrounding political climate.  The governments of Senegal and Burkina Faso
have been relatively tolerant of trade union activity, multipartyism, and free press.  He notes,
however, that most successful groups serve at least some government interests.  For example, the
economic activities of the farmer groups in Senegal have never threatened the cash crops that are
the lifeline of the Senegalese economy. A second obvious factor is the capacity for accumulating
capital and self-financing.  In certain types of water-retention or conservation activities, the size
distribution of land, land markets, or equality of access to communal land may influence the
chances for successful community action (Kikuchi et al., 1978).  ￿￿For example, the farmer group of Bamba-Tialene, part of the wider Entente ("common ground") de
Koumpentoum in eastern Senegal, has an Arts and Culture Committee that has been researching the theme of
peasant identity.  According to a farmer quoted by Pradervand "we researched our past to discover things that
are vital for our future, for instance, the principle of solidarity and mutual assistance upon which our society
was once based"(p. 129). 
26
  Charismatic leaders also seem to play a crucial role, and especially those with one foot in
the European world and one foot in the African world, who can play an intermediary role.  A
unifying ideology, a "hostile" external force, or a major obstacle to overcome help to rally support
and enforce cohesion.  Pradervand describes farmer groups in the Sahel as well as in Eastern and
Southern Africa, but finds only those in the Sahel to be pursuing goals related to rediscovering
and building on their own cultural identity.
13  He characterizes those of Zimbabwe and Kenya, for
example, as concerned primarily in improving material well-being.  Consistent with the major
hypothesis presented here, cultural endowments such as the structure of traditional society are
likely explanatory factors.  Many of the West African traditional societies were organized into
centralized states, whereas many of those in  Southern and Eastern Africa were acephalous. 
Differences in the more recent colonial experience, such as the relative magnitude of the European
settler presence in Zimbabwe and Kenya, may matter in certain comparisons.  
Conclusions
The example of the water-retention work of the Groupements Naam of Yatenga, Burkina
Faso demonstrates several points of importance to economists who research technical innovations
and work with development practitioners.  First, specific cultural endowments of the Mossi in
Yatenga appear to have reduced the cost of the institutional innovation and development and to
have facilitated technical innovation in rural communities.  Although the anthropological,  political￿￿For example, farmer groups are mentioned in the work by Sanders et al. and a recent study of the
Burkinabe extension system (Bindlish et al.), but the authors do not recognize how their operation may affect
economic analysis.
27
science, and economic literature all provide theoretical justification for the existence of mutual
assistance groups like those of the Naam movement, there is no formal articulation in the
economic literature of their role in technical change.  
Recent refinements in the analysis of impure public goods, game and contract theories may
furnish adaptable research tools that would improve modelling efforts, but economists need first
to recognize the economic significance of such institutions.
14  By lengthening the payback period
for an individual's investment in mutual assistance and by altering the nature of the premiums,
such groups may (1) encourage productivity-increasing technical changes when short-term private
costs appear to be prohibitive and (2) enable those changes to be sustained over time.  Important
caveats need to be raised, however, about the potential for continuity in the Naam movement and
for the replicability of such movements in other regions.
Established community organizations can be used for new purposes as the needs of
communities evolve.  Administrative autonomy and seed money can assist them in their
"renovation" process, but the story of Groupements Naam also suggests that the emphasis leaders
play on rediscovering certain unifying cultural values provided key ideological support to the
movement.  "Renovation" of community structures may be an effective strategy for participatory
development.  The case study illustrates the potential of such a strategy but also demonstrates the
need for further research to identify the conditions that facilitate or inhibit the effectiveness of
indigenous community organizations in serving as a bases for development.   28
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